Monday 13th
August 1917
Today Major
Bridcutt, the 7th Bedfords’ commanding officer, as promised a couple of days
ago, spoke to me further about the action they took part in on 10th August.
On the night
of the 9th/10th each man was given a cup of hot tea and rum as he filed up the
line into the attacking positions. Each platoon commander and sergeant was
handed copy of the situation map. Each platoon commander was allotted a guide
to conduct him to Surbiton Villas A white tape had been laid previously to
Surbiton Villas along which each platoon moved and could not possibly miss
their way.
As each
platoon arrived at a spot near Surbiton Villas they were met by a platoon guide
and the company commanders and were conducted to their battle formation. Here
they laid down in perfect quietness until the first note of the guns sang out.
A Company (the company in immediate support) moved from their cover in a tunnel
on the Menin Road by platoons to their place in battle formation, under the
same arrangements as the assaulting Companies.
D Company
(already in place and holding the line) furnished a covering party (one
platoon) who were posted about 150 yards in front of the forming up tapes,
pieces of trench which were almost identical to their forming up position
afforded this company protection in case of Bosche barrage being turned on;
this they occupied, moving forwards to Jargon Trench as previously ordered as
the attack went forward.
The
arrangements for forming up went without a hitch and at the appointed time
(4.35 a.m.) the guns opened and the attack went forward in a most determined
manner to the final objective which was reached at 5.13 a.m. Some 100-150 of
the enemy were in Glencorse Wood on the Battalion front as well as two machine
guns; these were knocked out and the teams destroyed in such a rapid manner
that any organised resistance by the enemy was at once overcome and most of
them that had not been killed at once cried "Kamerad" and ran forward
into our lines most of them wounded and fearfully frightened.
After the
objective had been reached battle patrols were sent out and posts established
in the usual way, along the south-western end of Nonne Bosschen Wood as near to
the protective barrage as it was safe to get. (i.e. about 200 yards). The
Battalion then commenced to consolidate.
During the
day the enemy made repeated attempts to form up and deliver what appeared to be
a counter-attack of some strength. He was prevented time after time from doing
so by rifle and machine gun fire, but owing to the expenditure of ammunition
and the difficulty of replenishing it, care rose to anxiety and the probability
of the foremost line and right flank, where the 11th Royal Fusiliers had
retired, being overcome.
Major
Bridcutt went on: “At this stage of the operation I considered it advisable if
the position was to be held with any degree of certainty it required artillery
support in the form of a few shots every few minutes on the only places the
Bosch could use to form up under cover from view i.e. Nonne Bosschen Wood,
Inverness Copse and the south-western portion of Polygon Wood”.
“This was
suggested over the telephone but so far as could be understood it could not be
arranged, consequently it appeared to me and others at the front that it was a
question of an SOS appeal for artillery or nothing at all and this signal was
repeatedly seen in the air at various points along the line but no SOS was
asked for by the 7th Bedfords until towards the evening when it was too obvious
that the Bosch intended to have a final struggle to get back the ground we
held, as troops were seen emerging from each of the three woods above mentioned,
and a dense cloud of smoke and gas was being sent over which obscured
everything from view. At this time I cannot state the exact clock hour, the
artillery opened and with terrible execution, but the Bosch line came on
delivering their attack on the right flank of the Battalion”.
“The advanced
posts were either killed or captured, it is impossible to say which, but
judging from the very intense barrage which the Bosch rolled over Glencorse
Wood they were undoubtedly killed. A certain amount of confusion set in on our
right and it was only by firm determination that the strong point which I had
taken over from the 11th Royal Fusiliers and Jargon Trench was held”.
“When the
attack was fully developing reinforcements (two companies) of the Royal
Berkshire Regiment arrived and were sent forward to hold our original front
line in case the Bosch succeeded in his object to gain the strongpoint and the high
ridge running from Stirling Castle through the strongpoint taken from the Royal
Fusiliers and Jargon Trench”
The attack
however did not materialise and only the enemy’s advanced line got near the
position. The situation quietened down and the relief of the Battalion by the
Royal Berkshire Regt was carried out by 2 a.m. and the Battalion withdrew to
Chateau-Segard. Major Bridcutt stated: “It is worthy of record the splendid
manner in which the two companies of the Royal Berkshire Regiment came up to reinforce”.
Finally,
Major Bridcutt told me the lessons he believes should be learned from this
operation.
1. I venture
to think had a fresh Battalion been close at hand when the situation on the
right became obscure and pushed in, in attack formation, a good deal more
ground would have been taken and the Bosch routed from his position.
2. Artillery
should not cease firing on protected lines until the Battalion Commander is
satisfied all is well. Artillery ceased on the 10th without any reference to battalions
(at least not to 7th Bedfords). I consider it of great importance that
Battalion Commanders should be able to convey to Artillery which fire other
than SOS is required.
3. No
telephone wire to be laid beyond Brigade Headquarters, as it is used for all
kinds of things that hopelessly give away arrangements, and too many other ranks
have access to it and the commanders of the sector having no knowledge of many
things happening on the wire unless he or his Adjutant sits by it. The
telephone was a nuisance and not the least assistance to the Battalion on the
10th inst.
4. It took
from 5 to 6 minutes before the Hun Barrage got really going on our lines, it
was severe when it did do so.
5. The 54th
Brigade arrangements for ordering up the reserve companies and the companies
for mopping-up was excellent, timing was also extremely good.
6. To avoid
any platoon going astray I placed Battalion Police posts 100-200 yards apart
along the ATN Track from the RITZ area to the Menin Road passing point.
7. Our own
Artillery inflicted many casualties on our troops by firing very short, what
appeared to be one 8 inch gun in particular.
8. The Bosch
attack was guided by a line of his men at a few paces apart firing Very lights,
during the advance these were with the first wave.
Source: X550/8/1
