Showing posts with label I Corps. Show all posts
Showing posts with label I Corps. Show all posts

Wednesday, 16 December 2015

All Change



Thursday 16th December 1915: the 7th Division, including 2nd Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment, has left I Corps and joined 3rd Army as part of the reorganisation of the British Expeditionary Force at this time of great expansion.

The adjutant of the Battalion passed on this message they received from Corps commander Lieutenant-General Gough: "Will you please let the 7th Division know how sorry I was to part with them, and not to be there to wish them farewell and good luck, and I do appreciate the great example of gallantry, discipline, and endurance that they always set for which and the results which they obtained by it, they have earned the deep gratitude of their Country and their Commander".

Source: X550/3/wd

Wednesday, 18 November 2015

2nd Bedfords to Change Armies



Thursday 18th November 1915: The adjutant of the 2nd Bedfords tells us that they have been told that towards the end of the month their division, 7th, will be withdrawn from I Corps, 1st Army and will join 3rd Army which was created in July under the command of General Sir Charles Munro and is now commanded by General Sir Edmund Allenby. The message received goes on: “Its place in the line will, in all probability, be taken by a new and inexperienced Division, who will have little idea of the difficulties of trench warfare in winter time. The General Officer Commanding hopes that no effort will be spared to hand over our present lines in such condition that our successors on arrival may start their campaign under favourable conditions”.

Source: X550/3/wd

Friday, 25 September 2015

The Battle of Loos Begins Today


The Attack of the 7th Division (Official History of the War, 
Military Operations France and Belgium 1915 Vol II)

Saturday 25th September 1915: As these words are written the latest and largest offensive so far undertaken by the British Expeditionary Force is under way around the coal-mining town of Loos in Northern France. We will report on the part taken in this conflict by our regiments tomorrow as information becomes available. We know that 7th Division is to make an attack on the village of Hulluch and that 2nd Bedfords are in reserve. The adjutant tells us that just after midnight the Battalion proceeded to ab position of assembly at the village of Noyelles, arriving there 3.35 this morning. From there it proceeded at five minutes past 6 a.m. moving by platoons at 200 yards distance to Vermelles, moving up a trench called Chapel Alley.

The following document, leaked from I Corps Headquarters shows what is taking place.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE ATTACK

1. The enemy is to be beaten on a certain length of front and driven out of it and must not be allowed time to reform in rear of the captured trenches.
For this a violent and continuous action is required.

The keynote of all the work, both as regards details and the general idea, is offensive action.

When once the enemy's front system of trenches is broken, delay is usually the chief cause of failure and heavy casualties.

Commanders must, however, bear in mind that, once the enemy's line is broken, it is the intention to follow up by such action as will cause a general retirement of a great part of the enemy's line. Thus the operations will be continued during a considerable period.

Supports and Reserves.

2. Bearing the above in mind, it is of the highest importance that all commanders should consider carefully the handling of their reserves to maintain the forward movement.

Under the existing conditions, only one definite offensive blow can be expected from one body of infantry, and, therefore, fresh troops must be pushed through those making the first attack to develop the success won. Troops heavily engaged during the day should not ordinarily be expected to continue the offensive on the following day, but should be either actually be relieved or arrangements made for fresh troops to pass through them. The Organization of reserves in depth should be made with this object.

Supporting and reserve troops must be close up from the commencement of the operations, so that they can follow close on the heels of the troops in front.
Commanders of such troops must clearly understand the objective and their role, and use their initiative.

Ample cover must be provided for the reserve troops well forward, with good and sufficient communication trenches. Direction boards must be put up to prevent mistakes in the existing labyrinth of trenches.

The Infantry Attack.

3. Infantry Commanders must know the time table of artillery fire, and regulate their progress and time their assaults in accordance with it.

The attack on the front trenches will probably not be equally successfully all along the line. Support must be given at once to the units which have been successful to enable them to press on. Where unsuccessful a new attack must be organised from a flank where the line has been broken.

If a certain body of infantry fails to gain its own particular local objective, there is no reason why the troops on either flank should be held up. Every body of infantry must push on and thereby facilitate the task of the troops on the right and left.

The whole operation can be regulated with the greatest precision. Parties of infantry should be detailed beforehand for the capture of the several localities at definitely stated times in accordance with the artillery time table. The accuracy of the photographic maps permits of this being done.

We must not wait to be counter-attacked, but must follow up our attack at once. Infantry must push on, and field guns, trench mortars, machine guns, etc., must be pushed forward in close support of the attacking infantry to batter down houses, etc. The responsibility for supporting the attacking infantry in this way rests with Infantry Commanders, and special guns will be allotted to them for this purpose.

Localities must be seized promptly to act as supporting points to further advance, but only the necessary number of men will be left to entrench each of these points.

All ground gained will be secured.

Artillery.

4. The artillery objective is not only the wire entanglements and front trenches, but the whole position, with a view to destroying the hostile infantry, actually and morally; (i.e. second line, communication trenches, shelters, etc., must be systematically dealt with).

The task of the artillery is: -
(a) The support of the infantry during its attack.
(b)To gain superiority of fire over the hostile artillery.

The artillery fire must be time-tabled and registered as far behind the enemy's front line trenches as possible, with due regard to range and accuracy.

The guns must be registered beforehand on all the objectives and tactical localities as far forward as possible.

Similarly, the barrages of shrapnel must be arranged beforehand. These will be gradually expanded as infantry advances.

The nature of the artillery support required by the infantry depends on the local conditions of the fight.

Some field or horse artillery guns must be ready to push forward rapidly in support of the infantry as the latter get beyond the support of the remaining guns.

Special Parties.

5. Special parties must be detailed for work subsidiary to the attack, such as bomb parties, sandbag parties, bayonet parties, entrenching tool parties.

These parties must all be conversant with their various duties.

The idea of the offensive must be inculcated in the grenadier parties, so that their efforts are directed to bombing so as to assist the movement to front and flank, rather than to mere defensive work and blocking approaches.

Special attention must be given to repairing roads, and detachments of Royal Engineers, with infantry working parties attached, must be organized and in position to follow up the attack for clearing away obstacles and mending roads, to allow free passage for troops.

Special parties for extending and maintaining the telephone wires must also be organized beforehand (see para.7).

Royal Engineers Stores and Materials.

6. Advanced depots of RE stores must be established close up behind our own lines at short intervals along the front of the attack. The depots should contain material for entanglements, sandbags, trench-bridging materials, tools, etc.

Parties of RE with infantry must be specially detailed to move forward with these stores to secure positions gained.

The experience of Neuve Chapelle gives a good indication of the nature and quantities of stores required for any given length of line, and estimates should be framed accordingly with regard to the length of the probable successive lines likely to be required to be placed in a state of defence.

Communications.

7. In order that the offensive may be continued without interruption and be suited to the changing conditions of the fight, the several commanders must be kept in close touch with the situation; hence communications must be carefully organised beforehand and adequate means of getting information back from the front provided. Wherever possible communications should be triplicated and arrangements made to carry on communications by flags, lamps, etc. when wires are broken. This is of the first importance, and all commanders will give this matter their close attention.

The ground over which the attack is to pass and the localities to be attacked can in most cases be seen and studied, so far as is possible, therefore, arrangements should be made beforehand between what points communication by flag or otherwise is to be established as the attack progresses.

The position of commanders must be carefully thought out and suitably protected points organized for commanders near their troops.

Telegraph and telephone wires must be buried up to our front trenches, and arrangements made to push wires on as soon as possible after the attack has passed beyond them.

Staff officers must be pushed well forward with the object of collecting information and keeping commanders regularly informed of the situation.
With this object in view, positions of observation and dugouts should be made, and special communications established beforehand with these places.
Special attention must be given to instructing signal companies in their duties and action during an advance, and all preparations must be made with a view to the forward movement being sustained.

Divisional Cavalry and Cyclists.

8. Divisional Cavalry and Cyclists must be kept handy to push on rapidly as opportunity offers, to anticipate the enemy in occupying houses and other tactical points, and so facilitating the advance after the enemy's main lines of defence have been broken.


Source: X550/3/wd

Tuesday, 22 September 2015

Inter-Arms Co-operation


Bristol Scout

Wednesday 22nd September 1915: As the big push nears an interesting memo has been leaked from I Corps Headquarters. It shows a revolutionary advance in co-operation between assaulting infantry, supporting artillery and observation aircraft, which we hope will give our men the edge in the forthcoming struggle.

“White linen arrows about 15 feet long and 3 feet wide, with arrow head at one end, also five other strips 6 feet by 1 foot 6 inches, will be carried by battalion headquarters”.

“When infantry are held up by hostile fire from trenches or houses, or other features at close range, and require support from heavy howitzers, an arrow will be laid out on the ground as near the obstacle as it can be brought, pointing towards it, with one 6 feet strip laid across-wise for every two hundred yards that the obstacle is estimated to be distant from the arrow”.

“The result will be that as soon as the aeroplane notices the signal, it will, if it can distinguish the target, call up a heavy howitzer and range it on the target, keeping the fire up until the signal is removed”.

“Example: A signal points at a house estimated to be 400 yards from the signal: - White linen arrow 15 feet by 3 feet”.

“The aeroplane on calling up a battery for this work will use a pre-arranged prefix, and the battery will only fire when "G" is sent by aeroplane.
Immediately the signal is removed, the aeroplane ceases sending "G" and the firing ceases”.

“Arrows must be picked up as soon as fire is required to cease”.

Source: X550/3/wd


Friday, 22 August 2014

The First Clash is Close at Hand

Alexander von Kluck

Saturday 22nd August 1914: The 1st Bedfords have moved up to camp in a wood called Bois Boussu. This is some six miles south-west of Mons where, we are now given to understand, the leading regiments of the army are now billeted. The Germans are very close. Our cavalry encountered a strong force of them early this morning at a place called Casteau to the north-east of the town. They charged a group of German uhlans[1], and drove them off, killing a number, the first Germans, we believe, killed by British troops in this war.

These Germans are, we believe, their 1st Army commanded by a man named von Kluck. This name has given our lads some ribald amusement and has quickly given rise to a song, to the tune “The Girl I Left Behind Me”, in which the men express the view that they couldn’t give a very vulgar expletive “for old von Kluck”!

It seems very likely that there will be a battle tomorrow. The French army is on our right around the town of Charleroi and our I Corps will take up positions along the road leading from Mons to Beaumont angled rather north-west to south-east. The II Corps, in which 1st Bedfords find themselves, is on the left, lining the Mons-Condé Canal. The army is thus formed nearly at right angles with II corps formed up west to east facing north and I Corps facing north-east or east.

Source: X550/2/5



[1] Uhlans were light cavalry armed with a lance as well as a sabre. They had a fearsome reputation.