7th September
1916: From our Correspondent in the Field
This morning
56th (London) Division have finally taken over the line vacated by 5th
Division. This includes Leuze Wood, which was captured unopposed on 5th and
6th.
Leading on
from our concersation of yesterday, the Commanding Officer of 1st Bedfords,
Colonel Allason, has sent me a copy of the recommendations he has made in the
light of the recent attacks.
1. Orders
were not always issued in sufficient time; thus the Order to attack Falfemont
Farm at 6.30 p.m. on 3rd, was only received at 6 p.m.
2.
Communication between Brigade Headquarters and the Battalion was bad. An
Operation Order to make an immediate attack on Falfemont Farm, issued at 12.30
a.m. on the 5th only reached Battalion at 8.0 a.m., though the distance was
under a mile. It was taken by a relay runner who lost his way.
Where relay
runners are used they should be stationed at telephone test stations, so that
the line can be followed. This is especially the case by night. If the shelling
is very severe these test stations should be closer together and cover
provided. An advanced "exchange" should be made where reports as to
progress made, etc., can be duplicated and sent out to neighbouring units.
Patrols can very rarely obtain this information.
3. When an
important success has been gained, fresh troops should be available to take
advantage of it before the enemy has time to re-organise, but where this is not
so even tired troops can push on provided their flanks remain secure.
Some sort of
signal, such as rockets or flares, visible from an Observation Post should be
pre-arranged.
Both field
and heavy guns should lift 800 yards or more according to the nature of the
signal, and thus enable the advance of our Infantry to continue.
4. One or two
Field Guns pushed well forward may be of great assistance in dealing with a
counter attack.
5. The
"P" Bomb for dug-outs and the arrangement of carrying 2 grenades per
man proved invaluable.
6. A machine
gun pushed into the front line safeguarded the left flank. Lewis guns were
pushed up close behind the line of bombers (the ground was convex) and did
excellent work at close range.
7. Military
police stationed on main avenues of approach and close to the front line could
send back into action cases of pseudo "shell shock" and also men not
carrying back their full load.
7th Division made another unsuccessful attack on Delville Wood this afternoon.
7th Division made another unsuccessful attack on Delville Wood this afternoon.
Source: X550/2/5
