Day Sixty Eight on the Somme

6th September 1916: From our Correspondent in the Field

Sadly the attack on the high ground near Ginchy yesterday failed, due to wire entanglements in the high corn, which had not been seen. I have spent a good part of the morning with the 1st Battalion, who have now been relieved from the front line by 56th (London) Division. This is despite a German counterattack which has led to delays meaning that some of units of the division are yet to be relieved.

The adjutant told me that they went into action with 20 Officers and 610 other ranks, and came out having lost 17 Officers and 289 other ranks, the majority of them wounded. He was grimly satisfied that they had fully succeeded in gaining their objective and had facilitated the advance on either flank.

Part of this satisfaction was due to adverse circumstances. The Battalion started with full water bottles on the afternoon of the 3rd and were only able to obtain water again on the morning of the 5th. During during this time they made an attack across the open and the following afternoon made another successful attack. Soldiers to whom I have spoken after going into action rate having drinking water more highly than anything else, except having sufficient ammunition.

The adjutant told me: “This lack of water was to a certain extent eked out by soda water, of which the German dug-outs were found to be well supplied when captured”.

The commanding officer, Colonel Allason, himself wounded, then took up the story: Sergeant Bush, the Battalion Signalling Sergeant, kept up communication between Brigade and Battalion Headquarters by telephone throughout the operations, except for short intervals(1). There were two intermediate stations for repair of line if that proved necessary and orderlies were able to follow the line to carry important messages”. His pride at this efficiency was underlined by the failure of others, as he told me ruefully: “This was not done by a Brigade Orderly carrying 15th Brigade operational order of 5th September, ordering an attack at once by night on Falfemont Farm. It was sent out at 12.30 a.m., and only received at 8.0 a.m, too late to be acted upon. By night a telephone line or even string will enable orderlies to find their way however intricate the country may be”.

He went on to say that after any battle lessons can always be learned, for example: “The necessity of giving Battalion Commanders more time to communicate their orders to subordinates. Not many Battalions could have moved off from a long line of trenches to assault a strong position 1,000 yards distant within a quarter of an hour of receipt” as, of course, his men had done.

The colonel than went on to praise Captain W H L Barnett: “Temporary Captain Barnett led the leading Company and directed those following in a masterly manner, after passing through the trenches of our front line, some 500 yards from where we started, they finished up, each Company, a formed unit on their objective. A previous attack that morning had failed and the temptation must have been great for men to drop into the front line trench and start firing”.

“Temporary Captain Barnett's Company also led the attack on the 4th against German position north-west of Falfemont Farm, under peculiarly difficult circumstances. His Company had been under our own barrage fire from daylight till 3.10 p.m., the last portion of which was intense. Many men had been killed and many buried. It was only by constant digging in that any survived, yet the assault was carried out with the utmost vigour. The capture gained the whole ridge and by drawing off German troops from the nearby quarry enabled the 95th Brigade to reach Leuze Wood practically unopposed that evening. It also indirectly facilitated the advance of the French troops”. The colonel told me that he has recommended decorations for both Captain Barnett and Temporray Captain West.

Though the 1st Bedfords are now behind the front lines, the fighting continues. 7th Division is still locked in a battle to take possession of Ginchy. After rain in the last few days the whole battlefield has become very muddy, which hampers any forward movement. So far, we understand, the village is still in German hands.

Sources: X550/2/5

(1) Sergeant James Bush from Bishop’s Stortford [Hertfordshire] was killed on 8th October 1917 and is buried at Hooge Crater Cemetery near Ypres.

Day Sixty Five on the Somme

Sunday 3rd September 1916 From our Correspondent in the Field

Today has been one of great activity here on the Somme with attacks across a front of five miles or more. There have been separate attacks in the Ancre Valley and on the Thiepval Ridge, at Mouquet Farm, at High Wood, at Guillemont and at Ginchy. We will begin this left to right progress, so to speak, in the Ancre Valley.

The 49th Division made an attack which began at the road from Hamel to Thiepval (known as Mill Road and Thiepval Road) and headed north towards Saint-Pierre-Divion. However, weather has been poor today, with drizzle reducing visibility and the attackers were caught by machine gun fire from the Schwaben Redoubt on their right flank. Some men did penetrate the enemy front line but were forced to evacuate it for lack of ammunition and reinforcements and by mid-morning it became clear that the attack had failed with no ground gained. This attack has made it clear that the whole Thiepval Ridge will need to be cleared of the enemy if any progress is to be made in the Ancre Valley.

To the south-east of the village of Thiepval the Australians have again attacked the remains of Mouquet Farm. They succeeded in capturing most of the rubble and the nearby trenches but have been driven out again by the Germans. All this fighting, both on the surface, in trenches and underground in bunkers has been of the most bestial hand-to-hand variety. The Germans are well aware that if Mouquet Farm falls the back door to Thiepval will be open.

The fight still goes on amongst the splinters of High Wood. 1st Brigade of 1st Division attacked here, again using flame-throwers and Livens Projectors, despite these weapons’ failure on 18th August. To assist the attack a mine containing 3,000 lb of high explosive was detonated under the eastern corner of the wood less than a minute before the troops moved into the attack, giving the Germans no time to recover. Unfortunately the Livens Projectors caused more harm to our men than to the Germans when a stray trench mortar shell exploded the oil drums they were supposed to use against the enemy prematurely. Thus the whole attack failed. This evening, about an hour ago fresh attacks have pierced the remains of the wood.

5th Division was given the task of finally taking the fortress village of Guillemont. This was carried out in combination with the French 127th Regiment. Unfortunately the French were pinned down in Combles Ravine, leaving our men to attack alone. 13th Brigade attacked Falfemont Farm whilst 95th Brigade attacked the spur of ground between Falfemont Farm and Guillemont. The attacks began just before nine o’clock this morning and succeeded in capturing the German front line. 

The second line, from Wedge Wood to the south-eastern tip of the village, fell just before one o’clock. A 13th Brigade attack on Wedge Wood was stopped short of its objective.

The 1st Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment, has been caught up in the fighting. Just before two o’clock this afternoon the battalion moved forward from Silesian Trenches just north of Maricourt. They reached the vicinity of Maltz Horn Farm about half an hour later and at three o’clock was ordered to move to trenches south of Angle Wood. They advanced in company with 16th Battalion, Royal Warwickshire Regiment into Angle Wood under heavy shelling which caused ten casualties. An hour ago, about six o’clock they began their attack on Falfemont Farm, as yet I have heard nothing of their progress.

20th (Light) Division attacked Guillemont from trenches to the west and south-west of the village. These were successful and the village was finally taken. This has led to German counter-attacks this afternoon and this evening but, as far as I can determine, British troops still hold the village, or what remains of it. 

7th Division attacked the village of Ginchy, north-east of Guillemont. Unfortunately, Delville Wood, with its German defenders, has a line of sight over the ground over which the division attacked, being able to fire on the left flank of the attack from the north. Men from 7th and 24th Divisions, thus, were given the task of taking Delville Wood and the trenches leading east from it, but did not manage to achieve their task. They succeeded in taking the eastern edge of the wood but plenty of Germans remained in adjacent trenches to fire at the attack on Ginchy.

7th Division attacked Ginchy from the west, from around Waterlot Farm (shown as "Sugar Refinery" on the map above), thus by-passing Guillemont which lies to the south. Their objective is the site of a telegraph tower, on a prominence east of the village. They were duly struck in their left by fire from the Germans in trenches east of Delville Wood, particularly from a trench called Ale Alley (all the trenches in this sector have been given names relating to beer by our men). I understand that the attack got into Ginchy but, due to the drizzle and murky conditions, could not be seen by headquarters. The Germans then counterattacked and drove the men of 7th Division out of Ginchy again. About 5.30 this evening another attack was launched but it seems to have come for nothing. It took over a month to finally capture Guillemont, everyone hopes, most profoundly, that it will not take another month to capture its sister village of Ginchy.

Source: X550/2/5

Day Sixty Four on the Somme

Saturday 2nd September 1916 From our Correspondent in the Field

The 1st Battalion remain in Silesia Trenches, just north of Maricourt, though it is finding working parties digging assembly trenches in the front line ready for the next great attack. Silesia Trenches have been receiving occasional attention from the enemy, one shell this evening wounding nine men of B Company in their trench. The adjutant remarked to me that this particular shell was “of a peculiar type. It burst on the parapet in a reddish light and formed no crater”.

At noon today 24th Division again took up the fight east of Delville Wood. This area is so pockmarked with shell holes as to resemble parts of the Moon visible through a telescope. The fighting was effectively shell-hole to shell-hole and the division were unable to push the enemy back from the eastern edge of the wood.

Over the last two days a curious little incident has been going on in far-off Egypt. The adjutant wired it to our staff due to its unusual nature. A local Bedford man named Ashpole has been in hospital suffering from some unspecified ailment. At five o’clock yesterday afternoon he escaped from hospital and swam across the Suez Canal “evidently quite insane”. He was recaptured in the early hours of this morning and once more sent to hospital, this time under guard, for his own safety.

Sources: X550/2/5; X550/6/8.

Day Sixty Two on the Somme

Thursday 31st August 1916 From our Correspondent in the Field

Around 1 pm this afternoon there was a massive German attack on British positions in Delville Wood and Longeval. It was preceded by an intense artillery barrage and much activity by German aeroplanes. There has been hand-to-hand fighting with 7th Division and 24th Division east of the wood. The Germans also attacked British positions along the road from Ginchy to Longueval but seem to have been held. The Germans appear to have penetrated the northern outskirts of Longueval.

On a happier note, the new adjutant of 1st Bedfords, now in reserve at Billon Farm near Bray-sur-Somme, tells me that this morning General Horne, commander of XV Corps presented medals for gallantry at Longueval. Acting Company Sergeant Major Afford was given the Distiguished Conduct Medal whilst Lance Corporal Pettengell and Private J King received the Military Medal. The adjutant is now Major N W Lawder because Captain H Williams has been evacuated as sick(1)

Major Noel Lawder

As I write these lines another German attack seems to be developing, probably on the east side of Delville Wood where, so far, they have achieved little. There is considerable noise of artillery, including the dreaded “whizz-bangs”, and I seem to be able to hear rifle fire too.

Source: X550/2/5

(1) Major Noel Wilfred Lawder would be killed on 4th September. He has no known grave and is commemorated on the Thiepval Memorial. 

Day Sixty on the Somme

Tuesday 29th August 1916 From our Correspondent in the Field

It turns out that last night’s attack by the 7th Division east of Delville Wood was something of a damp squib. A damp squib which, however, will no doubt have cost the lives of good men.

Day Fifty Nine on the Somme

Monday 28th August 1916 From our Correspondent in the Field

Today 1st Division has made a minor attack east of High Wood which has succeeded in gaining a small amount of ground. This evening an attack has begun on trenches east of Delville Wood by “the incomparable” 7th Division.  I can hear the noise as I write these few lines.

Day Sixteen on the Somme

Sunday 16th July 1916 From our Correspondent in the Field

Today I understand from the adjutant that 7th Bedfords, currently out of the front line at Maricourt, were ordered to be prepared to attack the village of Guillemont but as they began to move off around 2 pm the order was cancelled as the Germans were still holding parts of Delville Wood and Longueval village, immediately west of Guillemont. Sadly the South Africans have been so decreased in numbers that their attempts to take the last portion of the wood (the north-west tip) have come to nothing. An attack to take the northern part of Longueval village by other units of 9th Division was also repulsed.

Elsewhere the village of Ovillers has finally fallen after sixteen days of attacks. The victors, we believe, were units from 25th and 48th Divisions. In High Wood the units of 7th Division in the wood were withdrawn just before midnight in the face of overwhelming German numbers and strong defensive positions.

Source: X550/8/1

Day Fifteen on the Somme

Saturday 15th July 1916 From our Correspondent in the Field

Alas! My report of yesterday was written in high spirits, filled with expectation that a major rip had been made in the enemy line at High Wood and that cavalry, pouring through the gap could burst the whole front wide open. Sadly cavalry en-masse could not be brought up in time and, though the gallant 20th Deccan Horse did indeed charge into the wood and do great execution, it was a lone hand. Today 7th Division attacked High Wood at 9 am but found it now heavily garrisoned. There are, I believe, still units of 7th Division in the wood, contesting it with the German garrison even as I write.

Yesterday parts of the village of Longueval, immediately south of High Wood, were captured but the whole could not be gained. This morning the South African Brigade, part of 9th (Scottish) Division attacked the wood, determined to take it at all costs. The 2nd (Natal and Free State) South African Battalion attacked from the south-west at 6 am and the southern half of the wood was quickly taken. Soon after all but the north-west tip, where a German strong-point was located adjacent to the village of Longueval, was in South African hands and they began to dig in, at least, in-so-far as the roots and shattered trees would allow which, I understand from those who have spoken to South African wounded, was not very far.

At 11.30 this morning the Germans began launching counter-attacks, which were all repulsed with loss. This has continued all day but the men from the veldt have stood firm through it all and as I write a tremendous bombardment can be heard coming from the direction of Longueval village and its wood. 

Today 6th Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment took its first active part in the Battle of the Somme, having formed a defensive flank for the capture of Contalmaison. It is part of 112th Brigade, attached to 34th Division and made an attack on the village of Pozieres from south of Contalmaison as part of a brigade attack. Hostile machine-guns meant that the attack petered out about one hundred yards from the cemetery north of Pozieres where the men dug in. In this action the battalion lost 3 officers and 32 other ranks dead, 25 other ranks missing and 9 officers and 174 other ranks wounded. Clearly this village will not be easy to take but it must be taken as it is one of the highest points on the whole battlefield with commanding views west, south and east.

Source: X550/8/1

Day Two in the Somme

Sunday 2nd July 1916 From our Correspondent in the Field

It is evident this evening that my hopes, formed in expectation of the great success on the right flank of the British Army’s attack yesterday, were severely premature. As the day has gone on I have heard increasingly sombre accounts of the events of yesterday which took place elsewhere and it is with these that I will begin.

30th Division was on the right of the British attack with 18th Division on their left flank. On the left flank of 18th Division was 7th Division home, until late last year, of the 2nd Bedfords. This division lost severely yesterday but, through costly fighting, the Germans pulled back this morning leaving the village of Fricourt in its hands. Every other attack failed. Ten divisions achieved nothing bar acts of heroism in a losing cause. All were back in their own front line trenches by the end of yesterday. All this is very disappointing in itself. Far more than disappointing is the number of casualties. Yesterday 7th Bedfords were highly successful but lost around one third of their strength, of whom about one hundred were killed. Of the British Army overall, out of just over 150,000 men attacking the German lines over 56,000 have become casualties, of whom, we believe, around 19,000 have been killed. This is the same number of men lost in the three weeks of the Battle of Loos in September 1915 lost in a single day. To put it another way, the combined populations of a swathe of south Bedfordshire including the towns of Dunstable and Leighton Buzzard and their neighbouring parishes of Billington, Eggington, Heath and Reach, Houghton Regis, Stanbridge and Tilsworth as measured by the 1911 census are 18,293.

Last night the 2nd Battalion were consolidating ground won by the rest of their division, principally battalions from Manchester and Liverpool. They have carried on this work today, beating off four German counter-attacks. They have dug a new trench to link up the captured trenches to our old front line which they have taken upon themselves to name Bedford Trench

The 7th Battalion also spent the night after their attack in consolidating the ground they had helped to win in the Pommiers Redoubt and Beetle Alley. At day-break they returned behind the old British Front Line to Carnoy from the enemy's captured trenches and rested. As I write this they are about to move forward again, as a reserve battalion, to Emden and Austrian Trenches.

Today your correspondent caught up with Captain Bull, commanding officer of B Company who was wounded in the attack yesterday and is now receiving attention behind the lines. He spoke with feeling of the time the attack stalled in front of the Pommiers Redoubt: "The hour outside that trench will be a nightmare for years to come and this was our expensive time. There were about twenty men from the Royal Berkshires and about the same numbers of my lot. They were all splendid, the way they cut the wire just as if there was nothing doing”.

Colonel Price is penning a report to his Brigade Commander about the attack yesterday and has shared his thoughts with me about the reasons for its success. He believes there were eight of these and, in his own words, here they are:

1. The work of the artillery, with very few exceptions the wire was beautifully cut and the trenches filled up. The shooting was wonderfully accurate.

2. The training of the Battalion behind the lines at Picquigny (where attacks were practised for some weeks over very similar ground to yesterday’s). The time and attention to every detail that was carried out there was repaid a thousand-fold. As an example I may quote that only three officers in the entire Battalion got beyond Emden Trench, most of the platoon and very many section leaders had gone, yet so thorough was the training beforehand that the men carried on entirely by themselves, knew where to go to and what to do when they got there.

3. The clear and concise orders that were received, nothing had been forgotten and provision had been made made for all emergencies.

4. The good work done by the clearing up parties who followed our attack to deal with any Germans still not neutralised who might have fired at us from the rear. The work done by the 6th Battalion, Northamptonshire Regiment was splendid and we had no shooting from behind. I would suggest that these parties, so absolutely necessary, should be increased in strength.

5. The good work of the carrying up parties. In addition to those provided under Brigade arrangements, another party was made up from odd men in the Battalion such as cooks and mechanics, about thirty in number, and they carried up with A Company a supply of small arms ammunition and bombs. This party then returned to the most advanced dump and continued during the whole day to maintain the supply. A large number of bombs were used in clearing Montauban Alley and without the supply furnished by this advanced party matters would have come to a standstill. They did most excellent work and never ceased carrying until a large stock of bombs and ammunition had been accumulated. I would suggest this advanced carrying party going with the Reserve Company whenever possible.

6. The quickness with which the assaulting Battalions left our Trenches. Where a prearranged timetable barrage is arranged, it seems imperative that the men should be quick off the mark. In the assault the two companies left our trenches before cessation of intense bombardment. They were thus able to take full advantage of the artillery barrage(1). It would thus appear safer to risk a few casualties from our own guns than to miss the effect of the barrage and so come under the fire of enemy machine guns which are without doubt kept in dug-outs until the barrage has stepped forward. This point has continually been insisted by all those who were in the first waves.

7. The close co-operation of all units in the assaulting waves. This was very marked, both between our two companies and the company of the 11th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers on our left. With regard to the latter both at the Pommiers Trench and Redoubt they rendered most invaluable assistance at very critical times. Their help was very deeply appreciated and remarked on by the men of my Battalion. I would suggest also that in clearing Montauban Alley as far as Loop Trench considerable assistance was given by us to the 53rd Brigade which enabled them to make good their final objective.

8. A sustained and continual advance. This seems highly important and is exemplified in the taking of the Redoubt. Those immediately facing it were held up but elements which outflanked it pressed on, made use of their bombers and machine guns, killing or forcing the defenders to fall back. Those held up immediately pressed forward and allowed the lines to maintain their formations. An advance of this nature has, no doubt, a big effect on the morale of the enemy.

9. Communications - though minute and detailed arrangements were made for visual signalling and communication by runners, neither were very successful. Messages took a very long time in getting through, and the varying aspect of operations could not be brought quickly enough to the notice of higher authority. Perhaps some form of small portable wireless telegraphy might be arranged for in future operations(2).

Elsewhere on the battlefront the complete failure in the northern sector seems to have led to operations there being suspended. During the day 30th Division found that Bernafay Wood was undefended and so took it. Further north 17th and 21st Divisions launched an attack to try to capture two small woods called Bottom Wood and Shelter Wood immediately south of the village of Contalmaison, which lies east of Mametz Wood and is still in enemy hands.

Sources: X550/3/wd; X550/8/1

(1)  In other, less well-led, divisions, the familiar picture of men “going over the top” only once the barrage ceased was played out. Many of these men were killed in the first few seconds of the attack. Another familiar picture from the first day of the Battle of the Somme is men wearing packs weighing sixty pounds or more trudging slowly across No Man’s Land. Divisional orders for 18th Division made it clear that men were not to carry packs, indeed, were to carry the minimum of equipment. This enabled them to move at the double across the space between the front lines, cutting down the time spent there and the casualties suffered.

War Trophy of the Bedfordshire Regiment

Bedford Police Station in 1965 [BP65/54/3b]

Thursday 1st June 1916: An interesting ceremony was performed in the Police Station yard, Bedford yesterday morning when Major Lightfoot, of the Bedfordshire Regiment, handed to the Mayor of Bedford (Mr F R Hockliffe) the gun which was in November 1915 lent to the Bedfordshire Regiment in recognition of their gallantry in France when forming part of the 7th Division at the time the gun was captured from the Germans. The trophy was conveyed by a fatigue party of the Bedfordshire Regiment (amongst whom were several of the soldiers present at the capture), headed by the fine band of the Regiment, playing stirring tunes, and in formally presenting the gun Major Lightfoot said he had the honour of handing it over as a loan to the Regiment and hoped it would serve to remind those who saw it of the gallant conduct of their county regiment. They all, he knew, as he did, regretted that many gallant lives had been lost.

The Mayor thanked Major Lightfoot and the regiment for the honour done done to the Borough and said he had pleasure in taking the gun into safe keeping. He hoped that shortly they would have erected a suitable enclosure that would be worthy of the deeds done by the “Brave Bedfords”. He called for three cheers for the Bedford Regiment, which were heartily given and the brief proceedings concluded with the National Anthem.

Source: Bedfordshire Standard 26th May 1916

Finally the Attack Comes

Wednesday 23rd February 1916: The adjutant of the 2nd Battalion at Maricourt tells us that there was a heavy snowstorm yesterday which at least meant that the guns were silent. At dusk, however, the Germans made an attack on 7th Division, the division to which the battalion used to belong and which is now stationed on their left flank. The attack was preceded by an intense bombardment lasting half an hour. Heavy rifle and machine gun fire prevented the Germans getting a foothold in our trenches. “Those of the enemy who left their own trenches did not return” the adjutant told us with some satisfaction. No gas was used because it was too cold. The adjutant opined that this was probably the attack they had been warned to expect on 14th February, though directed against a different part of the line.

Source: X550/3/wd

2nd Bedfords leave 7th Division

Tuesday 21st December 1915: The adjutant of the 2nd Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment tells us that their Brigade, 21st, left 7th Division, with which they have been since landing in France in October 1914, two days ago. They are now part of the newly arrived 30th Division which otherwise consists of pals battalions – units comprised of men who signed up from the same localities. Those of 30th Division form part of Manchester Regiment and King’s (Liverpool) Regiment.

The commander of 7th Division, Major-General Watts, a previous commander of 21st Brigade said: “In taking leave of the 21st Infantry Brigade the Divisional Commander wishes to express his regret that it should have become necessary, in the interest of the Army, to part with the Brigade with which he has been so long associated. He also wishes to express his admiration for the magnificent services which the battalions of this Brigade have rendered since the 7th Division landed in Belgium, and his confidence that they will continue to maintain the same high standards of gallantry and efficiency in the new formation to which they are going. He wishes them the best of luck and success in the future".

Source: X550/3/wd

All Change

Thursday 16th December 1915: the 7th Division, including 2nd Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment, has left I Corps and joined 3rd Army as part of the reorganisation of the British Expeditionary Force at this time of great expansion.

The adjutant of the Battalion passed on this message they received from Corps commander Lieutenant-General Gough: "Will you please let the 7th Division know how sorry I was to part with them, and not to be there to wish them farewell and good luck, and I do appreciate the great example of gallantry, discipline, and endurance that they always set for which and the results which they obtained by it, they have earned the deep gratitude of their Country and their Commander".

Source: X550/3/wd

What the Engineers Have Been Doing

Monday 29th November 1915: We have heard from the 1st/1st East Anglian Royal Engineers about what they have been up to this month. They have been working near Givenchy-lès-la-Bassée, and thus in the vicinity of 2nd Bedfords, though with 2nd as opposed to 7th Division.

The have constructed of a new third line of defences from the Annequin-Auchy railway to the la Bassée Canal. They have been constructing new trenches, “dog’s legs”, machine gun emplacements, wire entanglements, dugouts and latrines and repairing existing trenches which were adopted as part of the line.

Source: WW1/WD3

2nd Bedfords to Change Armies

Thursday 18th November 1915: The adjutant of the 2nd Bedfords tells us that they have been told that towards the end of the month their division, 7th, will be withdrawn from I Corps, 1st Army and will join 3rd Army which was created in July under the command of General Sir Charles Munro and is now commanded by General Sir Edmund Allenby. The message received goes on: “Its place in the line will, in all probability, be taken by a new and inexperienced Division, who will have little idea of the difficulties of trench warfare in winter time. The General Officer Commanding hopes that no effort will be spared to hand over our present lines in such condition that our successors on arrival may start their campaign under favourable conditions”.

Source: X550/3/wd

The Battle of Loos Begins Today

The Attack of the 7th Division (Official History of the War, 
Military Operations France and Belgium 1915 Vol II)

Saturday 25th September 1915: As these words are written the latest and largest offensive so far undertaken by the British Expeditionary Force is under way around the coal-mining town of Loos in Northern France. We will report on the part taken in this conflict by our regiments tomorrow as information becomes available. We know that 7th Division is to make an attack on the village of Hulluch and that 2nd Bedfords are in reserve. The adjutant tells us that just after midnight the Battalion proceeded to ab position of assembly at the village of Noyelles, arriving there 3.35 this morning. From there it proceeded at five minutes past 6 a.m. moving by platoons at 200 yards distance to Vermelles, moving up a trench called Chapel Alley.

The following document, leaked from I Corps Headquarters shows what is taking place.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE ATTACK

1. The enemy is to be beaten on a certain length of front and driven out of it and must not be allowed time to reform in rear of the captured trenches.

For this a violent and continuous action is required.

The keynote of all the work, both as regards details and the general idea, is offensive action.

When once the enemy's front system of trenches is broken, delay is usually the chief cause of failure and heavy casualties.

Commanders must, however, bear in mind that, once the enemy's line is broken, it is the intention to follow up by such action as will cause a general retirement of a great part of the enemy's line. Thus the operations will be continued during a considerable period.

Supports and Reserves.

2. Bearing the above in mind, it is of the highest importance that all commanders should consider carefully the handling of their reserves to maintain the forward movement.

Under the existing conditions, only one definite offensive blow can be expected from one body of infantry, and, therefore, fresh troops must be pushed through those making the first attack to develop the success won. Troops heavily engaged during the day should not ordinarily be expected to continue the offensive on the following day, but should be either actually be relieved or arrangements made for fresh troops to pass through them. The Organization of reserves in depth should be made with this object.

Supporting and reserve troops must be close up from the commencement of the operations, so that they can follow close on the heels of the troops in front.

Commanders of such troops must clearly understand the objective and their role, and use their initiative.

Ample cover must be provided for the reserve troops well forward, with good and sufficient communication trenches. Direction boards must be put up to prevent mistakes in the existing labyrinth of trenches.

The Infantry Attack.

3. Infantry Commanders must know the time table of artillery fire, and regulate their progress and time their assaults in accordance with it.

The attack on the front trenches will probably not be equally successfully all along the line. Support must be given at once to the units which have been successful to enable them to press on. Where unsuccessful a new attack must be organised from a flank where the line has been broken.

If a certain body of infantry fails to gain its own particular local objective, there is no reason why the troops on either flank should be held up. Every body of infantry must push on and thereby facilitate the task of the troops on the right and left.

The whole operation can be regulated with the greatest precision. Parties of infantry should be detailed beforehand for the capture of the several localities at definitely stated times in accordance with the artillery time table. The accuracy of the photographic maps permits of this being done.

We must not wait to be counter-attacked, but must follow up our attack at once. Infantry must push on, and field guns, trench mortars, machine guns, etc., must be pushed forward in close support of the attacking infantry to batter down houses, etc. The responsibility for supporting the attacking infantry in this way rests with Infantry Commanders, and special guns will be allotted to them for this purpose.

Localities must be seized promptly to act as supporting points to further advance, but only the necessary number of men will be left to entrench each of these points.

All ground gained will be secured.

Artillery.

4. The artillery objective is not only the wire entanglements and front trenches, but the whole position, with a view to destroying the hostile infantry, actually and morally; (i.e. second line, communication trenches, shelters, etc., must be systematically dealt with).

The task of the artillery is: -

(a) The support of the infantry during its attack.

(b)To gain superiority of fire over the hostile artillery.

The artillery fire must be time-tabled and registered as far behind the enemy's front line trenches as possible, with due regard to range and accuracy.

The guns must be registered beforehand on all the objectives and tactical localities as far forward as possible.

Similarly, the barrages of shrapnel must be arranged beforehand. These will be gradually expanded as infantry advances.

The nature of the artillery support required by the infantry depends on the local conditions of the fight.

Some field or horse artillery guns must be ready to push forward rapidly in support of the infantry as the latter get beyond the support of the remaining guns.

Special Parties.

5. Special parties must be detailed for work subsidiary to the attack, such as bomb parties, sandbag parties, bayonet parties, entrenching tool parties.

These parties must all be conversant with their various duties.

The idea of the offensive must be inculcated in the grenadier parties, so that their efforts are directed to bombing so as to assist the movement to front and flank, rather than to mere defensive work and blocking approaches.

Special attention must be given to repairing roads, and detachments of Royal Engineers, with infantry working parties attached, must be organized and in position to follow up the attack for clearing away obstacles and mending roads, to allow free passage for troops.

Special parties for extending and maintaining the telephone wires must also be organized beforehand (see para.7).

Royal Engineers Stores and Materials.

6. Advanced depots of RE stores must be established close up behind our own lines at short intervals along the front of the attack. The depots should contain material for entanglements, sandbags, trench-bridging materials, tools, etc.

Parties of RE with infantry must be specially detailed to move forward with these stores to secure positions gained.

The experience of Neuve Chapelle gives a good indication of the nature and quantities of stores required for any given length of line, and estimates should be framed accordingly with regard to the length of the probable successive lines likely to be required to be placed in a state of defence.

Communications.

7. In order that the offensive may be continued without interruption and be suited to the changing conditions of the fight, the several commanders must be kept in close touch with the situation; hence communications must be carefully organised beforehand and adequate means of getting information back from the front provided. Wherever possible communications should be triplicated and arrangements made to carry on communications by flags, lamps, etc. when wires are broken. This is of the first importance, and all commanders will give this matter their close attention.

The ground over which the attack is to pass and the localities to be attacked can in most cases be seen and studied, so far as is possible, therefore, arrangements should be made beforehand between what points communication by flag or otherwise is to be established as the attack progresses.

The position of commanders must be carefully thought out and suitably protected points organized for commanders near their troops.

Telegraph and telephone wires must be buried up to our front trenches, and arrangements made to push wires on as soon as possible after the attack has passed beyond them.

Staff officers must be pushed well forward with the object of collecting information and keeping commanders regularly informed of the situation.

With this object in view, positions of observation and dugouts should be made, and special communications established beforehand with these places.

Special attention must be given to instructing signal companies in their duties and action during an advance, and all preparations must be made with a view to the forward movement being sustained.

Divisional Cavalry and Cyclists.

8. Divisional Cavalry and Cyclists must be kept handy to push on rapidly as opportunity offers, to anticipate the enemy in occupying houses and other tactical points, and so facilitating the advance after the enemy's main lines of defence have been broken.

Source: X550/3/wd

Plans for the Big Push

The Loos area (Official History of the War: 
Military Operations France and Belgium 1915 Vol II)

Thursday 23rd September 1915: A leak from 7th Division shows the scale of the offensive our forces at Loos are expecting to deliver in the next few days.

1. INFORMATION.

(a) The enemy.

The enemy's defences on our front consist of two well defined systems of trenches. The front system runs west of Fosse No. 8 and follows the ridge southwards towards Loos. 1,500 yards to the east is the second system of trenches running through Haisnes -  Cité-Saint-Elie – Hulluch. Both these systems are protected by wire. The 117th Reconstituted Division is holding the trenches immediately in our front, with its regiments in the following order from the North: - 11th Reserve Regiment, 157th Regiment, 22nd Reserve Regiment. The VIIth Corps is to the north and the IVth Corps to the south of this Division.

(b) Our own troops.

The 1st Division (IV Corps) is on our right.

The 9th Division (I Corps) is on our left.

2. INTENTION.

(a) On conjunction with the French, the 1st Army will assume the offensive on September 25th and advance between Lens and the la Bassée Canal towards the line Henin – Lietard - Carvin, I Corps moving generally on to the line Pont-à-Vendin - Bauvin, IV Corps advancing simultaneously south-eastwards, with its left on Pont-à-Vendin. The Western end of Hulluch is included in the IV Corps area of advance.

(b) The task of the 7th Division is to clear the trenches in front of them; occupy the remainder of Hulluch, Benifontaine, Puits No.13, and Cité-Saint-Elie; and from these places continue the advance on Pont-à-Vendin and Meurchin, seizing the Canal crossings about these places.

(c) Immediately on the right of the 7th Division, the left Brigade of the 1st Division (IV Corps) will advance simultaneously and attack the west end of Hulluch. The boundary between our right and the 1st Division left runs just South of the Vermelles - Hulluch Road.

(d) Immediately on our left the 9th Division will attack the Hohenzollern Redoubt, and thence FOSSE 8, continuing their advance on Haines and Douvrin.

3. 7th DIVISION PLAN.

(a) The 7th Division will be distributed as follows, according to preliminary orders already issued.

In front.

On the right, 20th Brigade Column (20th Infantry Brigade, 95th Field Company, RE, No.1 Mortar Battery).

On the left 22nd Brigade Column (22nd Infantry Brigade, 54th Field Company RE, No.10 Mortar Battery, D Trench Mortar Battery).

In reserve.

21st Infantry Brigade.

Highland Field Company RE

Divisional Mounted Troops (Divisional Squadron and Cyclists - Commander. Major Hall, the King's (Liverpool Regt.).

The Divisional Artillery is under the immediate orders of the GOC I Corps until the advance begins.

After the advance begins, the 14th Royal Horse Artillery Brigade will operate in immediate conjunction with the 20th Brigade Column; and the 35th Field Artillery Brigade in immediate conjunction with 22nd Brigade Column, and the remainder of the Divisional Artillery, including attached Batteries, will be under the orders of the Brigadier General, Royal Artillery, 7th Division.

(b) The 20th Brigade Column will attack the enemy's trenches from the Vermelles-Hulluch Road inclusive to the Slit Work exclusive; and thence move on Hulluch.

The 22nd Brigade Column will attack from the Slit Work inclusive to approximately G.5.c.8.7. and thence the Quarries, Cité-Saint-Elie, and Puits No.13.

From the above places, the 20th Brigade Column will continue its march on Vendin-le-Vieil, and, Pont-à-Vendin and the 22nd Brigade Column on Wingles and Meurchin.

(c) The artillery will bombard the enemy's trenches and positions previous to the assault, under orders of the Corps Commander. A separate daily programme has already been issued.

The action of the Divisional Artillery to cover the actual infantry assault, is shown in the Time Table attached.

After the preliminary bombardment is over, Artillery will be lifted on to objectives further in rear according to the prepared programme.

It may so happen that some points will have to be re-bombarded.

On such occasions the general arrangement will be as follows (unless special orders are issued at the time for counter procedure).

On the obstruction being detected either by sight or by information being sent back, the Artillery bombardment will be ordered on the place from where resistance comes.

This will continue for half an hour, the last five minutes will be intensive.

The Infantry attacking such pints will thus know when the Artillery bombardment is going to cease; even if they fail to note when it actually begins, they will recognise its approaching end by the 5 minutes intensive fire. The infantry may thus be able to gain graound [sic] during the bombardment and will be prepared to rush in directly the intensive 5 minutes fire is over.

This applies to important places.

Small localities must be dealt with by the Forward Observation Officer accompanying the troops.

The Divisional Artillery will push on to closely support the infantry, as soon as possible.

Source: X550/3/wd

Looking After the Animals

Monday 20th September 1915: It seems that offensive operations are indeed soon to take place around the town of Loos on the flat plain, interspersed by slag heaps, in northern France. The following memo has been leaked from 7th Division Headquarters

“The following are the Veterinary arrangements for the forthcoming operations: -

The Officer Commanding No.12 Mobile Veterinary Section has posted an advanced Collecting Station at le Marais, opposite the 37th Field Artillery Brigade Ammunition Column lines. All seriously wounded animals should be sent to this station and handed over to the veterinary personnel; conducting parties to return at once to their units”.

In case of an advance necessitating the forward movement of any considerable number of animals, another Collecting Station will be opened at Noyelles and posts placed on the roads West of Vermelles to intercept and direct men bringing in wounded animals”.

“In case of a general advance, the Mobile Veterinary Section will move forward in the rear of the Divisional Train”.

“Wounded horses will not be evacuated until after dark unless large numbers are received and congestion is feared”.

Source: X550/3/wd

Dereliction of Duty and Cowardice

Friday 10th September 1915: Our perception that a major offensive is near at hand is strengthened by the following “secret and urgent” order issued by the General Officer Commanding 7th Division.

“There have been a certain number of cases during the last few months of officers who have failed to do their duty in the face of the enemy. In reporting these cases, Officers Commanding units have almost invariably asked or recommended that the officers may be sent home on medical grounds as suffering from nervous breakdown”.

“It must be clearly understood that failure to carry out their duty, whether by officers or men, can only be excused on medical grounds when there is a physical incapacity. It has been noticed, however, that many officers have been excused who apparently could walk, run and eat well”.

“Under such conditions any failure to control their nerves amounts to cowardice, pure and simple. This fact must be recognised by all Commanding Officers and Medical Officers. The General Officer Commanding directs that, in future, any officers who fail in their duty from incapacity to control their nerves, unless accompanied by physical disability, are invariably to be brought to trial for cowardice”.

“In some cases Officers have been sent home on medical grounds who, if they had been Privates, would most probably have suffered the death penalty”.

“Such a state of things cannot be allowed to continue, and is most detrimental to discipline and to the standard of leadership and honour among officers”.

“The contents of this memorandum are to be communicated as "SECRET" to all Brigadiers and Commanding Officers”.

Source: X550/3/wd