Tuesday 18th May 1915: We understand that the last twenty four hours have been frenetic and costly for 2nd Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment as they went into action north of Festubert. Before we come to what our local regiment has done, however, it might be best to set the scene by describing what has been happening across the battlefield as a whole.
Yesterday morning there was still a gap between the 2nd and 7th Divisions, caused by the unevenness of their separate advances. This gap had been in some measure closed by the elimination of the garrison of a position called The Quadrilateral but falling rain made attacks difficult. By 9 a.m. most of the Germans between the two divisions had either been killed or had surrendered and by 10.15 that strongpoint was in British hands.
The next stage of the attack was to begin at 2 p.m. with 2nd Division and 3 p.m. with 7th Division, including 2nd Bedfords, as we will hear presently. These attacks both failed. The 7th Division attack failed due to heavy fire coming in on their flank from a newly dug, and unnoticed, German trench system. The 2nd Division attack could not be organised until after the 7th Division attack had already begun and did not develop until 5 p.m. Its route was then blocked by reserve troops of 7th Division. By 8 p.m. they reached the line held by 21st Brigade. It may be of interest to readers that one of these units of 2nd Division was the 1st/1st Battalion, Hertfordshire Regiment, a Territorial Army unit.
Meanwhile, 2nd Bedfords were ordered about 1.30 p.m. to move at shortest notice and about 3 p.m. orders were received to move to a position in the rear of the old German fire trench between points referred to as L1 and L2 (see the map at the head of this page) in order to make an attack in conjunction with 4th Battalion, Cameron Highlanders. There was no time for reconnaissance of the four hundred yards of ground in front of them. The grass was about a foot high and the going looked reasonable enough. So about 7.30 p.m. B and C Companies advanced south-eastwards to the attack, on the right of the 4th Camerons. Two sections of bomb throwers under Second Lieutenant W. J. Stonier worked on the right down a communication trench towards points numbered K.4 and K.5. B and C Companies were less successful; on vacating the trenches to make the assault they were met by heavy shrapnel, machine-gun and rifle fire, one of the acting Company Sergeant Majors being killed as he climbed over the parapet(1).
By about 9 p.m. when the whole Battalion, less two platoons of A Company, which were kept in reserve by commanding officer Major Cranleigh Onslow, had been launched in attacks, information was received that the officer commanding the attack had called a halt, as he was unable to collect a party sufficiently strong to assault the German position, owing to the darkness and the many serious obstacles which could not have been seen previously due to the tall grass. These obstacles were ditches varying from two to five feet in depth and the same dimensions in width and filled with water, running diagonally as well as parallel to the advance. They broke all cohesion in the attacking force. The Bedfords were also unable to get in touch with the Cameron Highlanders. We understand that a number of men have drowned in these water choked ditches.
Just at this time too, Second Lieutenant Stonier reported having arrived at the point called K.4 and, meeting with opposition in that neighbourhood, his party had expended all their bombs and had themselves come under fire from bombs and trench mortars from their objective, the point known as K.5 and had had to retire into the communication trench, which they continued to hold.
A portion of the Battalion had, in the meantime, retired to its original position. It is difficult for civilians such as ourselves fully to comprehend the atmosphere of confusion, doubt and fear that prevails upon a battlefield but this catalogue of unexpected setbacks and misfortunes goes some little way to enlightening us.
Under these circumstances Major Onslow reformed the whole of the Battalion in the original position from which the attack had been launched. It goes without saying how bitter our proud boys feel about this complete failure. Sadly, during these operations Major Mackenzie VC was killed.
During the night information was received that a portion of the 4th Cameron Highlanders had succeeded in entering the enemy trench system. Accordingly, about 3 a.m. Brigadier-General H. E. Watts telephoned, ordering that the Bedfords should advance along the communication trench towards points K.4 and K.5 and take the German trench from that flank, to join up with the Camerons.
A new supply of bombs having been received, the bomb throwers of D Company under Second Lieutenant C. H. Brewer, with A and B Companies, in support were ordered to make their way along the communication trench to K.5 to gain possession of that point and work along the German trench to the point numbered L.8 to meet the Cameron Highlanders.
While this attack was developing, the commanding officer received authentic information that the party of Cameron Highlanders who had gained the enemy trench had been bombed out of it and retired from it during the night. This information, and also the fact that the Bedfords were very weak in numbers was telephoned by Major Onslow to Brigadier Watts, who replied that if Major Onslow was absolutely convinced that no Cameron Highlanders were holding any portion of the German trenches, he should stop further operations and make good ground occupied.
The Bedfords, therefore, ceased their advance and consolidated K.4 and the communication trench, holding it with Second Lieutenant Brewer’s bomb throwers, D and A Companies, with C and B Companies remaining behind the original starting point for the attack (Points L.1 and L.2).
The adjutant mentioned to us that during the night Second Lieutenant B. H. Waddy, attached from 3rd Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, who had been doing excellent scouting and reconnaissance work, had to be removed from the firing line by order of the Medical Officer and admitted to Hospital. This Medical Officer, Lieutenant D. G. Watson, who had been most assiduous in tending and removing the wounded from the firing line under heavy shell fire, was severely wounded by shrapnel on his way back to his dressing station. Seven stretcher bearers were also either killed or wounded(2).
This morning the Battalion is still holding the line and points mentioned above. No doubt the battle will continue for some days yet but the large number of casualties the Bedfords have taken may mean that their active participation in it has come to an end(3).
Source: X550/3/wd
(1) This gallant soldier was Arthur Sidney Brown, who had already won the Distinguished Conduct Medal. He was in C Company and was 26 years old. He had been born in Mogerhanger and information was later received that he had been promoted to be Second Lieutenant in the 2nd Battalion, Cheshire Regiment. He has no known grave and is commemorated on the le Touret Memorial.
(2) Sadly, Lieutenant David Galloway Watson died of his wounds on 5th June. He, too, was 26 and from Edinburgh. Despite his obvious bravery he does not seem to have been recommended for any gallantry award. He is buried in Étaples Military Cemetery – “First officer to be laid in the cemetery”.
(3) This was the sort of shambles, brought about by poor communication, bad weather, lack of time to make and co-ordinate complex plans, a determined and resourceful enemy and sheer bad luck that would earn the First World War such an evil memory and cause such high casualties to armies of all nations.
%2BBedfordshire%2BRegiment%2Bcap%2Bbadge%2B%5BX550-1-195-1%5D%2BSMALL.jpg)
%2BBedfordshire%2BRegiment%2Bcap%2Bbadge%2B%5BX550-1-195-1%5D.jpg)
%2BBedfordshire%2BRegiment%2Bcap%2Bbadge%2B%5BX550-1-195-1%5D.jpg)
